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Some Semiotic Features of Sentence Modeling 
 
Daniel F. Short, Asia University 
 
In his system of semiotics, pragmatist philosopher, Charles S. Peirce, proposes three 
types of signs, which, in their interplay, serve as the basis of human communication. 
Treating activities of secondary language acquisition as structural instances of 
Peirce’s sign-forms may offer insight into the semiotic structure of such activities, 
while also suggesting a tentative method for identifying the roles of semiotic 
components in the more general process of learning.  
 
On this occasion, I will attempt to describe the roles played by Peirce’s signs in the 
somewhat formal activity of sentence modeling, in which language students in a 
college setting attempt to duplicate a given sentence’s structure while using words of 
their own choosing. The attempt to apply these Peircean ideas of semiotics might also 
suggest methods for identifying common and potential paths of communication both 
among students as well as between students and their instructor. 
 
Peirce’s Three Major Signs 
According to Peirce, the semiotic basis of communication rests on the mixed use of 
three types of signs— “likenesses,” “indications” (or “indices”) and “symbols.” 
(Peirce, sections 1-9). Examples of the first of these include “icons,” mathematical 
and architectural diagrams, “imitative sounds” and “gestures” (sections 3-5). 
Instances of the second type, indications, are bi-partite in that they rest upon a 
physical relationship between two parts of reference. Examples include photographs, 
maps, or descriptions by pointing, though both photographs and maps often serve as 
signs of the first category as well (sections 3-4). Indications entail clarifying relative 
positions of the speaker and hearer. For example, in describing a particular house or 
event, one would have to contextualize it spatially or temporally, for example, 
referring to landmarks in the former case, and time markers in the latter. Other 
examples include a person being hailed by someone or being surprised by a sound. 
Still others include weathervanes, sundials, and letters that stand in for parts of a 
geometric figure (sections 3, 5). The third type of sign, symbols, consists of one or 
more signs that refer to ideas by convention. Examples include words such as “give,” 
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“force,” or “marriage.” “A symbol,” says Peirce, “cannot indicate any particular 
thing; it denotes a kind of thing” (sections 6, 8).  Peirce’s use of the word “kind,” 
here, is especially important in establishing the meaning of the third of his signs, since 
it offers a contrast to the first two types in which reference is often tied to specifiable, 
observable objects. Yet while Peirce distinguishes this type of reference from that 
indicating seemingly apparent structural equivalence (likeness) or implied physical 
relationship (indication), he holds that all three are used together as symbols, that 
symbols are the basis of conceptual thought. Peirce stresses that all three signs serve a 
function of “representation” within the thinker’s mind (section 8). What I hold this to 
mean is that even the first two types of signs serve as figures of thought rather than 
mechanisms of either strictly ostensive or denotative reference. For example, he 
speaks of a “reasoner” employing a “mental diagram” as a form of an icon or likeness 
(section 9).     
 
The Assignment 
In isolating the roles played by Peirce’s signs in student sentence modeling, we ought 
to consider several sectors or phases of activity: the instructions for completing the 
activity, the textual content of given models in relation to that of student writing, and 
the instructor’s evaluation of the student’s work.  
 
The instructions of the exercise as presented by me in some of my courses dictate that 
students should first read each sentence model, then attempt using the highlighted 
phrase or word of each model in two sentences they compose themselves. There are 
several reasons I ask students to duplicate application of the model. First, in the event 
that students copy the example of the given word or phrase provided in their 
dictionaries, they still must make one attempt at writing their own sentence. Secondly, 
often times there are two or more ways to use a phrase or word in the vernacular or 
idiomatically, and though I indicate one way in which the given word or phrase 
should be used, students often inadvertently apply the word or words in two distinct 
ways. When that happens, I try to help students see the distinction between the two 
types of usage. Thirdly, students often make a very paltry attempt at diverging from 
the entire model, in essence copying much of the sentence. When asked to apply the 
structural concept once more, they often make a more thorough attempt at 
constructing their own sentence. After I provide these initial instructions, I read each 
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model sentence aloud, both attempting to produce pronunciation and emphasis based 
upon standard American English and implying by way of vocal contrast the roles 
played by key words in the sentence. In addition, I make brief suggestions about 
common errors to avoid in applying some of the models, often by orally offering one 
or two more examples.  
 
Likenesses 
Ideally, as students inspect the models while I present my instructions, they are 
already constructing in their minds what Peirce would call potential sentences that 
share a likeness with the given model. In those instances in which students are free to 
place one word from the model in numerous possible places in their own sentence, 
checking to ensure that such likeness exists may do little to ensure correct application 
of the highlighted vocabulary. But in some instances, checking for likeness of 
structure can reassure the students they have correctly applied or preserved at least 
one part of the model. At least three instances in which this might be the case include 
the use of modal verbs, the use of such collocations as “on condition that” or “raised 
the issue of”, or the placement of such phrases as “in order to” or “as a result of.” 
Whenever possible, I indicate what prepositions must be attached to a phrase so that 
the bracketed meaning of the sentence is preserved. One of the many examples of this 
is the phrase “target of” as in “Some students are targets of bullying.” Indeed both 
visual and auditory reminders about what ought to be retained from the model are 
quite valuable, given that students routinely neglect to include part of key phrases or 
they alter the phrase in a way that sacrifices the sense of the intended message.    
 
Indications 
According to Peirce’s notion of likeness, some part, or parts, of each model serves as 
a diagram for the written sentences, but the sentences are also composed as a reaction 
to both the instructions and the models. Within the confines of this classroom context, 
the instructions and models serve as prompts or pointers that indicate how the 
students ought to proceed. The sentences written by the students serve also as a record 
or index that can be inspected after the students have gained more fluency in the 
language. From such a vantage point, both parts of the index can then be compared 
with each other and the writers can determine whether, and, if so, to what extent, their 
written portion conforms to the original model. Alternatively, one can view the 
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assignment as a map of a territory of language, the sentences serving as evidence for 
where the students went by using the map’s indicators. Viewed as either a 
comparative index or map, the models and reactions to the models play the role of 
Peirce’s indications.  
 
Symbols 
By looking at how students use visual and other cues to adopt new language, we see 
that Peirce’s semiotics might provide at least one account for how people often 
discover and learn conventions of linguistic (and non-verbal) communication, or just 
as importantly, how people fail to do so. Some of these conventions include the 
multiple layers of connotations that are attached to words and phrases, meanings that 
often cannot be illustrated using visual or auditory aids. In Peirce’s own semiotic 
parlance, these conventions would be referred to as symbols. So, while it is easy to 
grasp how repeatedly pointing to something while always making the same gesture or 
sound might help people perform a task of reference, it is less clear how people are 
assured that they are referring to conceptual notions in an agreed upon way.  
 
Likeness-Indication-Symbol  
A challenging aspect posed by the assignment for both the students and instructor is 
using a single sentence to demonstrate knowledge of routine use of a phrase in 
English. The formal contours of the activity render all references and claims posed by 
the sentences not merely hypothetical but non-assertive in nature. In fact, it is 
counterproductive for the student to seek to use the sentences as ordinary expressive 
devices and for the instructor to critique them solely for either their propositional truth 
or referential accuracy. Yet, at the same time--and this is an intriguing aspect of the 
activity--the students and instructor must be concerned with more than just the 
semantic relationships of the words themselves. “Symbols grow,” says Peirce. “They 
come into being by development out of other signs” (sections 8).  According to this 
view, semiotic content is organic, shared, and the meanings attached to signs are 
always in the process of being compared to the experiences people do and do not have 
of them within culture. When students are asked to write sentences in response to 
proposed models, they naturally and immediately draw on their associations of signs 
gained through their own experience. As a result of this, student sentences--and 
perhaps from the point of view of students, the model sentences--contain what amount 
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to unsupportable claims or esoteric references. I provided students with the following 
model, asking them to apply the use of the word “except” in their own sentences: 
I’ve visited every country in Asia, except Vietnam. 
One student wrote the following: 
I hate everyone in the world, except my own family. 
With this sentence, the student successfully demonstrates understanding of our 
everyday use of the bracketed word. On the other hand, her claim is a surprising one, 
and the instructor may doubt that it possesses propositional validity. It could be that 
the student and instructor, because of their respective cultural and linguistic 
backgrounds, are each applying different notions of the word “hate” as they read the 
sentence, or it could be that the sentence relies too heavily on exaggeration. In any 
case, it would be unfair of the instructor to challenge the student to provide evidence 
for the claim itself. Since no general claim of authorial responsibility or assertive truth 
is attached to the model sentences, neither should there be any assumed in the case of 
student work. For this reason, challenging the student’s understanding and use of 
“hate” would not only be unfair, but, arguably, even signaling to the student some 
surprise at her use of the term, may undermine a clear and accurate evaluation of the 
student’s work. The student sentences, then, serve as a set of counter-indications or 
prompts that bear allusion to both the models and the evaluation made by the 
instructor. In fact, the comparative nature of such indications would often make very 
clear to the instructor how to “read” the sentences as well as how to respond to the 
student. 
  
In performing the work of the assignment, students often struggle with their limited 
vocabulary to imagine the bracketed phrase applied in a new context. Sometimes they 
merely mimic the phrasing of the model by making use of synonymous phrases drawn 
from electronic language aids. Other times they ignore those parts of likeness that 
ought to be retained. In both instances, they fail to demonstrate understanding of the 
symbolic content of their own sentences, content that is discoverable in the multi-
arrayed and ever shifting site of culture.  
 
In one instance, I wrote the following model sentences on the board: 
(1) Before I went to bed, I checked for my alarm clock. 
(2) Before I went to bed, I checked my alarm clock. 
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Before instructing them to use the underlined portion of model #1 in their own 
sentences, I provided a gestural demonstration of the meaning of the two sentences. 
One student wrote the following in response:  
The doctor checked me for my illness. 
While this sentence is not grammatically incorrect, it does fail to demonstrate that the 
student understands the symbolic content that is tied to one or more of the signs. 
Recalling Peirce’s statement that symbols “denote a kind of thing” (my italics) 
(section 8), we see the difficulty of pinpointing the exact place in her sentence that 
consists of the error. We might suggest that the preposition “for” and the possessive 
pronoun “my” create confusion, but she might then fairly ask what exactly is the 
reader confused about. Our subsequent attempt to clarify our answer would likely 
invoke even more complicated signs in English than she is able to comprehend. Of 
course it is possible that through a combination of gestures, sounds, and language, the 
instructor can help the student grasp what she misapplied, but this does not mean she 
will also grasp how to correct her mistake. Situations like these often end with 
students accepting that in order to produce an expression deemed correct, they must 
alter their phrasing to fit what amounts to a superficial sort of likeness of convention, 
even while not entirely understanding what meanings are either gained or lost in the 
process. In cases in which the student has neither made an explicit grammatical error 
nor successfully applied one or more concepts of the sentence, effective interpretation 
of counter-indications can be more difficult. Often, the instructor might elect to avoid 
making claims about the student’s work that the student will unlikely be able to grasp.  
 
Conclusion 
Robert Lane points out the likelihood that Peirce’s “signs” and “thoughts” are 
inclusive of the non-propositional (3-6), such as “feelings and images” (6). This 
perhaps highlights the associatively complex and inaccessible range of symbolic 
thought. While it’s possible that some of these features of thought are shared between 
individuals, we are without a sure means of verifying when and to what extent this 
occurs. In both Peirce’s illustrations of how people perform mundane acts of 
reference and our own observations of second-language acquisition, symbolic 
association is continually checked, and presumably halted and revised, through the 
use of other symbols, likenesses and indications (the latter two often being especially 
pivotal). Finally, far from being an endorsement of a certain form of assignment, the 
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preceding analysis is meant to serve as an example of how one might use but one 
semiotic approach to assign structural relevance to the key features of a planned 
communicative activity. In attempting such reflection, one may gain a more useful 
understanding of the probable role semiotics plays in the exchange of ideas toward 
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